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Abstract 
In this paper, a novel approach to behavioural 
modelling is presented with reference to 
biological infection spread in communities. Its 
potential application to various terrorist-related 
scenarios is discussed in relation to attack 
point simulation and interdiction simulation. 
1. Introduction & Background 
Terrorist attacks can take many different forms 
using a wide range of weapon types or tactics 
and this poses some considerable problems in 
defining both the risks that arise in modern 
urban environments as well as optimising 
interdiction and response strategies. Critical 
infrastructure is dispersed and provides 
multiple vulnerabilities and opportunities for 
attack.  As attacks both in London and, more 
recently, in Mumbai have shown, modern 
terrorism should be thought of as requiring a 
3D spatial vulnerability approach to counter 
terrorism. [Flaherty, 2008]. While both game 
theory and queuing theory have been used for 
assessing terrorism events we present an 
alternative approach to this problem which 
overcomes their fundamental problem, that of 
estimating the number that get through to 
attack. 
 
Microsimulation is a discrete simulation 
technique which allows for the modelling of 
the behaviour of single individuals in a 
complex system [Connor et al, 2000; Mertz, 
1991].  It was originally devised for financial 
and economic modelling [Weinstein, 2006; 
Orcutt, 1957], but is generally applicable to a 
wide range of scenarios. 
 
In the current research project, we have created 
a modular, scalable microsimulation package, 
called Simulacron, which allows for the rapid 
creation of microsimulations involving large 
numbers of people interacting with each other 
and their environment. 
 
The framework is designed around a 
master/slave architecture, in which the 
processing of the simulation can be arbitrarily 
divided among one or more worker (slave) 
processes under the supervision of the master 
process.  Each of these processes may operate 
in a loosely-coupled environment such as that 
provided by a cluster or network of machines.  
This architecture allows for the development of 
models of far greater size and complexity than 
could reasonably be supported by a monolithic, 
single-process design. 
 
The only requirement the framework imposes 
upon the model is that it must be expressible 
using a combination of distinct locations and 
individuals.  All interactions and behaviours of 
these are specified by the simulation model 
itself.  Due to its modular nature, the 
framework places no requirements for any 
particular state information for locations or 
individuals; their state may be arbitrarily 
extended by each module to allow for 
composition of model components into 
arbitrarily complex simulations. 
 
In addition to this simulation framework, we 
have also developed a number of support tools 
including a prototype non-linear visualisation 
package which allows for the creation of 
complex visualisations by non-programming 
personnel. 
 
Models are specified using a template 
language, based on XML, which permits the 
creation of very large data sets via the 
instantiation of relatively simple macro 
templates.  For example, this allows the 
specification of a single template for a 
statistically average individual which can then 
Application of Microsimulation to the Modelling of Terrorist Attacks 
Ian Piper, Daniel Keep, Tony Green, Ivy Zhang 
School of Computer Science and Software Engineering 
University of Wollongong 
School of Risk and Safety Sciences 
University of New South Wales 
ian@uow.edu.au 
 
be instantiated an arbitrary number of times to 
create a background population into which 
unique individuals may be “injected” to 
simulate specific behaviours.  XML is also 
currently used for the output of all data, 
although work is underway to transition to a 
more compact and easily managed 
representation. 
 
The initial study undertaken was the simulation 
of an influenza epidemic [Grist, 1979] at the 
Royal Naval School (RNS) in Greenwich, 
London in 1920.  It was of particular interest 
due to the relatively complete information 
available regarding the outbreak, including the 
progress of the disease over time and its 
infection mechanism [Dudley, 1926] as well as 
the behaviour of the population in its “normal” 
state [NMM, 2007].  This scenario was also 
attractive in that it occurred in an essentially 
closed community for which we have detailed 
historical documentation [Bold, 2000]. 
 
The model of the RNS outbreak involved the 
creation of nine dormitories, nine reading 
rooms, around 40 classrooms and roughly 15 
other locations including the hospital. Student 
behaviours were established in seasonal class 
groups involving a total of 951 students.  In 
addition, the behaviours of 27 staff were also 
modelled. Each of these individuals is assigned 
a unique set of infectious parameters based on 
statistical distributions shared between all the 
participants. When the simulation starts, each 
person is sent to their appropriate location 
based on their schedule.  The movements and 
interactions, including cross infection, of the 
individuals is then modelled over time by 
Simulacron. 
 
Behaviours are a mixture of constrained 
(students must follow their timetables, sleep in 
assigned dormitories, etc.) and unconstrained 
(students move about freely at playtime).   As 
stated previously, the modular nature of the 
framework allows us to use whatever 
behaviours are most appropriate for the model 
at hand. 
 
The underlying infection model used in the 
simulation is conceptually a combination of the 
“Susceptible, Infective, Recovered, 
Susceptible” and “Susceptible, Exposed, 
Infective, Recovered” models (commonly 
known as SIRS and SEIR respectively) 
[Kermack and McKendrick,1927; Daley and 
Gani,1999].   In addition to the standard states, 
we added two mechanisms to the model.  The 
first, “hero” time, allows the simulation of the 
“I’m too busy to get sick,” or “It’s just a little 
cold,” phenomenon.  The second, isolation, 
allows for individuals to be removed from the 
cross-infection domain once disease is 
detected.  The isolation mechanic can be 
conditionally applied only during particular 
hours of the day.  The parameters are 
effectively selected by a convergence 
methodology against the historical data. While 
the full procedure is still being developed, the 
results in the case study presented agree 
reasonably well with other influenza studies. 
[Halloran 2001]   
2. Preliminary Results 
The original 1920 outbreak lasted for roughly 
25 days. Each simulation was run over 30 
virtual days with a time step of five minutes 
and output every hour.  The output represents a 
snapshot of the entire population, recording the 
location and infection state for each individual.  
For infected individuals it also records the 
source of the infection, and when they became 
infected. This data allows comparison with the 
historical number of new cases every day. 
 
Systematic changes to the model parameters in 
successive simulations allowed investigation of 
the sensitivity of parameters against the 
historical data.  Furthermore, by varying only 
the initial random seed, different instances of 
the same underlying process can be modelled, 
allowing the determination of statistical 
parameters, such as mean and standard 
deviation for such properties as number of 
deaths. 
 
Our technique also allows us the investigation 
of additional properties of the infection process 
which would be extremely difficult, if not 
impossible, to evaluate with traditional 
statistical modelling.  Chief among these is the 
ability provided to determine “infection 
chains”, a chronological sequence of who 
infected who, where and when. 
 
The results, even allowing for the relative 
simplicity of the model and the inevitable 
inexactitude of the parameter estimates, 
showed remarkably close agreement with the 
historical data, as seen in Figure 1 below, 
capturing the development, peak and recovery 
times with surprising accuracy. Contrast this 
with the result of the more traditional purely 
statistical model shown in Figure 2.   
 
 
 
 
 
It could be argued that the statistical model is, 
in a sense, more accurate than the simulation 
results as it provides a precise match for the 
total number of cases.  However, the 
simulation method clearly provides a much 
more realistic, if less “exact”, result.  
 
An unexpected outcome was the presence, 
among the simulation series, of runs in which, 
despite all parameters being the same, no 
epidemic occurred.  This suggests that further 
investigation may be required into the 
“known” causes of epidemic spread  
3. Adapting the Model to Terrorist 
Scenarios 
The studies we are currently conducting are 
more directly of interest to the present 
audience as they include models related to 
terrorist activity.  Two of these we briefly 
describe below. 
 
In support of this, a more comprehensive 
model has been developed involving 14402 
individuals, grouped into families, whose 
overall properties match the statistical census 
data for Australia, interacting in an 
environment of 6935 locations including 6000 
homes, and 935 workplaces, schools, 
recreational areas, hospitals, etc. The people 
move within the community according to 
schedules that emulate employed, part-time 
employed, unemployed and home workers, 
primary and secondary school children and 
infants that again match statistical data for 
Australian communities. 
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random seed, but 
identical parameters.
Figure 2 
Figure 1 
The orange line is the 
prediction of the 
traditional SEIR 
statistical model, with 
the historical data in 
blue. 
3.1. Attack Point Simulation – the 
“living bomb” 
The first proposed model addresses the 
question “What happens if we vary the point of 
release chosen by a terrorist conducting a 
biological attack?” 
 
The required model behaviour for this scenario 
can be achieved, without change to the 
previously described infection model, by the 
injection of a “living bomb” represented as a 
single individual who remains stationary for 
the duration of the simulation and can become 
highly infectious at a predetermined moment in 
time. 
 
Four locations in a virtual community were 
used as a preliminary assessment of the impact 
of location on release from a “living bomb”. 
The four locations were a cinema complex, a 
club, a large store, and the community 
hospital.   
 
The infection that was used in the simulation 
was based on smallpox with typical time 
parameters given by CDC information [CDC, 
2004]. The probability of infection for each 
individual was the reproduction rate for an 
infected person adjusted for the timestep used 
in the simulation.  The initial release emulated 
a badly constructed device with limited ability 
to spread infection.  
 
 Figure 3 shows the cumulative number of 
people who visited the four locations. Only 
two of the simulations resulted in infection 
spread, the club and the cinema complex with 
one infection each over the release time.  The 
infection occurred about 10 hours after the 
release. The pathogen in the absence of the 
human host was assumed to be viable for 
approximately 24 hours. The time of first 
infection is shown in Figure 3. It suggests that 
in any release there is a threshold of exposure 
required to spread infection; this can be the 
number of people or the time exposed. The 
store and the hospital did not have enough 
people moving through the building to ensure 
that someone contracted the disease. 
 
In the two cases of disease spread, the spread 
of disease continued to spread through the 
community. The first appearance of symptoms 
occurred 14 days after exposure in the cinema 
and 18 days from the club. By 80 days, 2560 
and 2016 people were infected from the 
cinema and club exposures respectively. With 
this particular disease, the relatively long 
incubation period does allow time for 
intervention, isolation and ring vaccination so 
long as surveillance systems for the disease 
identify a case quickly.  The second infected 
person in each simulation become 
symptomatic 26 and 31 days after the primary 
exposure by which time there were 4 and 5 
additional infecteds.   
 
These early results suggest that the location of 
release will be extremely important to the 
number of subsequent cases of infection that 
occur. While more studies are required to 
elucidate the sensitivity to population moving 
Figure 3:  Biological Attack Symptoms 
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through a target and dispersal effectiveness at 
the point of delivery, the result does have 
implications for assessment of risk, the 
provision of resources for dealing with an 
outbreak and the effectiveness of possible 
control mechanisms.   
3.2. Interdiction Simulation 
The second proposed model addresses the 
question “How effective is a specific 
interdiction regime?” 
 
This required the development of a new 
simulation module to be integrated with the 
existing components.  This new module, the 
“TPC” system, allows the modelling of three 
distinct groups with differing behaviours as 
follows: 
 
Terrorists (the “T” group) are individuals who 
move through the environment until, at a 
predetermined moment in time, they attack, 
causing the “deaths” of any individuals sharing 
their location.  Each terrorist has, in addition to 
standard model parameters, a “camouflage 
factor”, Fc, which determines how effective 
they are at concealing themselves from law 
enforcement. 
 
Police (the “P” group) are individuals who 
move through the environment attempting to 
detect terrorist presence.  If a police officer 
detects a terrorist then that terrorist is “killed” 
(removed from the simulation).  Each police 
officer has, in addition to standard model 
parameters, a “perception factor”, Fp, which 
determines how effective they are at spotting 
the bad guys. 
 
Citizens (the “C” group) are the remaining 
individuals in the environment.  They do not 
participate in the simulation except in the sense 
that they could be killed at any moment. 
 
Detection is deemed to have occurred if, in any 
simulated period of time in which a terrorist 
and a police officer are collocated, a randomly 
determined value falls below the detection 
threshold defined as the interception factor = 
Fp ( 1 – Fc ). 
 
This basic model may be varied by changing 
properties in a logical manner.  For example, 
replacing the instantaneous lethality of the 
terrorist attack with a probabilistic one (a 
smaller bomb) or replacing it with a 
conventional infective state simulating the 
release of a biological agent. 
 
Because of the flexibility of the program, 
police behaviours may range from completely 
random to precisely specified, the latter 
allowing the investigation and validation of 
predetermined interdiction strategies such as 
those derived from game-theoretic modelling 
[Pita et al, 2008]. 
 
The community used in the above “living 
bomb” scenario was used with the club as a 
target location for a terrorist attack. The 
terrorist was embedded in the community 
undertaking normal activities arriving at the 
point of explosion just before the time the 
explosion is due. Police also moving about the 
community are attempting to stop the attack.  
In the nine scenarios tested the three factors 
that are used in the simulation are shown in 
Table 1. There was one terrorist and ten police 
in these simulations. 
Figures 4 and 5 show the results of the 
simulation; Figure 4 shows how the 
interception factor influences the date and time 
of interdiction or attack while Figure 5 shows 
the location and the number of dead or injured 
as a function of that date and time. The only 
simulation to get to the target time of 03 Jun 
21:23 was run 8.  Pre-emptive detonation only 
occurred in run 0. The other 6 simulations 
resulted in successful arrest.  The decline of 
the interception factor (Figure 4) follows the 
transition from early to later times in 
interception, eventually resulting in no 
interdiction and the terrorist reaching the target 
at the designated time.  
 
A second series of five simulations were 
undertaken to show the effect of reducing the 
number of Police available for hunting and 
stopping the terrorist using the interdiction 
factors for run 0 in Table 1.  The results show 
that even though the model parameters are 
high compared with that required to get to the 
target at the target time when there are 10 
police, reducing the numbers of police can also 
result in reaching the target at the designated 
time. 
Run 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Camouflage Factor 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.95 0.99 
Perception Factor 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Pre-emptive factor 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Interception factor 0.16 0.12 0.1 0.08 0.04 0.02 0.01 0.005 0.001 
 
Table 1:  Interdiction Factors 
 
These two examples of simulation show the 
potential power in this type of modelling as it 
can not only look at coordinated attacks but 
also the requirements for resources, the levels 
of perception or intelligence assistance and the 
tactics that are needed to optimise these 
resources if these types of activities are to be 
prevented. 
4. Discussion and Future 
 
Our method differs significantly from other 
methods for assessing interdiction strategies 
[Atkinson and Wein 2008; Hazen et al, 2003] 
as it is time rather than event driven and based 
on the detailed modelling of individual 
behaviour within population groups rather than 
more abstract constructs. 
 
Because of this, we can “inject” deterministic 
behaviour patterns for specific individuals into 
a background population modelled with 
randomly varying properties. 
 
The advantage as we see it over existing 
techniques is that it can produce in simulations 
both the successes and failures together with 
full information about the paths to success or 
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failure. The biological model is not a standard 
compartmental SEIRS type model and is more 
readily suited to backcasting and forecasting 
methods required for decision support in live 
situations.  Furthermore, because it simulates 
actions of the individual it can test alternative 
policies and social controls that are difficult if 
not impossible to test without making some 
gross assumptions.  Because of these attributes 
it can be used to test assumptions being made 
in other techniques which are not testable. 
 
From its inception, the simulation system was 
intended to be part of an integrated risk 
modelling and assessment software 
environment.  To this end, it is intended to 
integrate the Simulacron package with a more 
fully-realised version of the visualisation 
environment, allowing a bi-directional real-
time flow of data between them. 
 
This will allow dynamic monitoring and 
modification of the simulation process via an 
intuitive graphical interface.  Key to this 
process is the planned development of a 
scriptable supervisor process which will 
moderate and coordinate this data exchange. 
 
With this framework, it should be possible to 
integrate further state of the art simulation 
packages dealing with such matters as the 
effects of fire, explosions, etc.  This would be 
achieved by the representation, within 
Simulacron, of externally simulated events via 
such mechanisms as a “survivability index” for 
a set of locations and the dynamic modification 
of behaviours to represent the response to 
death, injury and damage to locations.  The 
addition of further Simulacron modules would 
allow the modelling of emergency response to 
such events. 
 
One of the key aims of the development of this 
package was that it be capable of running at 
better than real-time.  This will allow the 
coupling of non-simulated events to permit the 
use of the simulation environment to predict 
reactions and potentially to investigate 
alternate response strategies in a live system. 
 
Another use is as a forensic tool to analyse past 
events and to investigate the likely result of 
alternative intervention strategies. 
 
Interest in this project has already been 
expressed by a number of groups within 
Australia, each of which has seen a different 
potential use.  These range from examination 
of policy effectiveness in public health, 
through training scenarios (spot the terrorist) in 
law enforcement to its use as a decision 
support environment by emergency response 
organisations. 
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